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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is an appeal by Gerald Coates ("Coates") from a 
judgment and sentence in a criminal case. Coates pleaded 
guilty to armed robbery and related offenses, and as a part 
of his sentence, the District Court ordered him to pay 
restitution in the amount of $4,028. Coates now challenges 
the restitution order. Because the District Court erred by 
imposing restitution without specifying a payment schedule 
or considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. S 3664(f)(2), 
we vacate the restitution order and remand for resentencing 
in accordance with this opinion. 
 
I. 
 
In June and July of 1996, Coates and a co-conspirator, 
Haywood White, committed three bank robberies in which 
they obtained a total of $8,056. Coates pleaded guilty to 
two counts of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery 
and one count of conspiracy to commit bank robbery, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371; two counts of armed bank 
robbery and one count of bank robbery, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 2113(d); and two counts of use of afirearm during 
and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 924(c). The District Court sentenced Coates to a 
term of 291 months of imprisonment,1 to be followed by five 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Specifically, Coates received 60 months of imprisonment on the three 
conspiracy counts; 87 months of imprisonment on the three robbery 
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years of supervised release, and imposed an $800 special 
assessment. The Court also ordered Coates to pay 
restitution in the amount of $4,028, without anyfindings or 
further explanation of the award. Coates then took this 
appeal. 
 
Counsel for Coates filed a motion to withdraw and 
submitted a brief in support of his motion pursuant to 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel's Anders 
brief advised that there is no non-frivolous issue that can 
be raised on Coates's behalf. Coates was provided with a 
copy of the motion, and he filed a pro se brief in support of 
his appeal, raising two issues: (1) that the District Court 
erred in enhancing his sentence on the second weapons 
conviction because Congress did not intend 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(c)(1) to permit enhancement where a second or 
subsequent weapons conviction is charged in the same 
indictment as the first weapons conviction; and (2) that the 
District Court committed plain error by failing to make 
specific factual findings concerning Coates'sfinancial 
ability to pay $4,028 in restitution and by failing to order 
an appropriate payment schedule. 
 
After examining the record, we found that Coates's 
second argument raised a non-frivolous issue.2 Accordingly, 
we denied counsel's motion to withdraw and requested 
additional briefing on "[w]hether the District Court erred in 
failing to specify in the restitution order `the manner in 
which, and the schedule according to which, the restitution 
is to be made,' pursuant to the Mandatory Victims 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
counts, to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed on the 
conspiracy counts; 60 months on the first weapons count, to be served 
consecutively to the conspiracy and robbery counts; and an enhanced 
sentence of 84 months on the second weapons count, to be served 
consecutively to all other sentences. 
 
2. We agree with counsel that Coates's first argument is frivolous. Coates 
contends that the District Court misapplied 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1) by 
enhancing Coates's sentence on the second weapons conviction even 
though it arose from the same indictment as hisfirst weapons 
conviction. Both the Supreme Court and our court already have rejected 
this argument. See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993); United 
States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 221 
(1997). 
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Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. S 3664(f)(2)." After 
reviewing the parties' briefs, we conclude that the District 
Court erred. 
 
II. 
 
Coates contends that the District Court erred by ordering 
him to pay restitution without specifying in the restitution 
order the manner and schedule of payments to be made 
and without considering his financial resources, projected 
earnings, and financial obligations. Because Coates did not 
object to the restitution order at the sentencing hearing, we 
review this issue for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) 
("Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be 
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court."); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). 
 
Congress enacted the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 
("MVRA") in 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, Title II, SS 201- 
211, 110 Stat. 1214; 18 U.S.C. SS 3663A-3664 (West Supp. 
1996).3 The MVRA applies to sentencing proceedings in 
cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after April 
24, 1996. See 18 U.S.C. S 3664 (statutory notes). Coates 
pleaded guilty on October 11, 1996, for criminal activity 
that took place during the summer of 1996. Therefore, 
application of the MVRA to Coates is appropriate here. Cf. 
United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(imposing restitution on defendant for criminal conduct 
occurring prior to MVRA's enactment violates Ex Post Facto 
Clause). 
 
The MVRA makes restitution mandatory for certain 
crimes, see 18 U.S.C. S 3663(A)(1), and requires district 
courts to order the payment of restitution in the full 
amount of the victim's losses "without consideration of the 
economic circumstances of the defendant." See 18 U.S.C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The MVRA substantially amended the provisions for restitution set out 
in the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. S 3663 et seq. (West 
1985). Under the VWPA, district courts had discretionary authority to 
award restitution. In ordering restitution, however, courts were required 
to consider, among other factors, the defendant'sfinancial ability to pay 
restitution in establishing the amount of restitution to be ordered. 18 
U.S.C. S 3664(a) (West 1985). 
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S 3664(f)(1)(A); see also United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 
792, 796 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that MVRA's "clear and 
unambiguous mandatory language" requires defendants to 
pay full restitution to their victims). After ordering full 
restitution, the district court "shall specify in the restitution 
order the manner in which, and the schedule according to 
which, the restitution is to be paid." See 18 U.S.C. 
S 3664(f)(2); see also United States v. Crandon, No. 98-5161, 
1999 WL 147606, at *3 n.3 (3d Cir. Mar. 18, 1999) ("[A]fter 
ordering full restitution, the district court must set a 
payment schedule."). In so doing, the district court is 
required to consider the financial resources, projected 
earnings, and financial obligations of the defendant. See 18 
U.S.C. S 3664(f)(2)(A)-(C). The court may order the 
defendant to make a single lump-sum payment, reasonable 
periodic payments, or, if the defendant is indigent, nominal 
periodic payments. See 18 U.S.C. S 3664(f)(3)(A), (B). 
 
The District Court in this case complied with the MVRA 
by ordering Coates to pay the full amount of his share of 
the victim's losses, $4,028. After doing so, however, the 
District Court failed to satisfy the remaining statutory 
requirements. It did not specify in the restitution order the 
"manner in which, and schedule according to which," the 
restitution is to be made. Nor did it state on the record that 
it had considered Coates's financial situation in 
determining his ability to make a single lump-sum payment 
of $4,028. Since the MVRA mandates that district courts 
schedule restitution payments after taking into account the 
defendant's financial resources, the District Court's failure 
to do so here constitutes plain error. See United States v. 
Turcks, 41 F.3d 893, 901-02 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that the 
court's failure to make factual findings under the VWPA 
constitutes plain error), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1074 (1995). 
 
We are unpersuaded by the government's arguments to 
the contrary. The government maintains that the District 
Court complied with the statutory requirements because 
under section 3572, and in view of the District Court's 
silence, full payment was due immediately. Section 3572 
provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       A person sentenced to pay a fine or other monetary 
       penalty, including restitution, shall make such 
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       payment immediately, unless, in the interest of justice, 
       the court provides for payment on a date certain or in 
       installments. . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3572(d)(1). This section applies to all monetary 
penalties, including fines and restitution orders, and it 
creates a preference for immediate payment. Contrary to 
the government's suggestion, however, this provision in no 
way eliminates the district court's obligation under section 
3664 -- "Procedure for issuance and enforcement of order 
of restitution" -- to consider the defendant'sfinancial 
situation and schedule restitution payments accordingly. 
We therefore reject the government's claim that section 
3572 permitted the District Court to satisfy its duties under 
section 3664 through its silence. 
 
The government next maintains that the District Court 
complied with the MVRA by making payments due during 
the term of the defendant's imprisonment. In making this 
contention, the government points to a paragraph of 
standard-form language in the restitution order that 
provides: 
 
       Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise in the 
       special instructions above, if this judgment imposes a 
       period of imprisonment[,] payment of criminal 
       monetary penalties shall be due during the period of 
       imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalty 
       payments, except those payments made through the 
       Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility 
       Program, are to be made as directed by the court, the 
       probation officer, or the United States attorney. 
 
Supplemental Appendix at 7a. Like section 3572, this 
paragraph does not establish a payment schedule, nor does 
it indicate that the District Court considered Coates's 
financial circumstances. It is therefore insufficient to satisfy 
section 3664(f)(2). 
 
As an alternative argument, the government contends 
that the District Court's failure to comply with the statutory 
requirements is not fatal because, through its silence, the 
Court delegated responsibility to establish a payment 
schedule to the probation office. See 28 C.F.R. S 545.10 
(permitting Bureau of Prisons to determine payment 
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schedules). In making this contention, the government cites 
Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548 (9th Cir. 1998), 
in which the Ninth Circuit held that the district court may 
delegate its statutory responsibilities to a probation officer. 
The government's reliance on Montano-Figueroa is 
misplaced. 
 
Like most other federal appellate courts that have 
addressed the issue, we have held that the fixing of 
restitution payments is a judicial act that may not be 
delegated to a probation officer. See United States v. 
Graham, 72 F.3d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that, 
under the VWPA, the duty to establish payment schedules 
is non-delegable), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1286 (1996); see 
also United States v. Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1438-39 
(7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Porter, 41 F.3d 68, 71 (2d 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808 (4th 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Albro, 32 F.3d 173, 174 n.1 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (per curiam). A court abdicates its judicial 
responsibility when it permits a probation officer to 
determine the manner and schedule of restitution 
payments. Although we recognize that federal regulations 
permit the Bureau of Prisons to make payment schedules 
for all monetary penalties, see 28 C.F.R.S 545.10, the plain 
language of the MVRA, vesting sole authority in the district 
courts, see 18 U.S.C. S 3664(f)(2) ("[T]he court shall . . . 
specify . . . the manner . . . and the schedule . . . [of] 
restitution"), contradicts, and thus overrides, the 
regulations. 
 
That Graham was decided under the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act, the former statute setting out the 
requirements for court-ordered restitution, does not make 
its conclusion inapplicable here. Unlike the MVRA, the 
VWPA provides the district courts with discretionary 
authority to schedule restitution payments. See 18 U.S.C. 
S 3663(f)(1) (West 1995) ("The court may require that [the] 
defendant make restitution . . . within a specified period or 
in specified installments.") (emphasis added). Even under 
this more lenient standard, Graham holds that the 
scheduling of restitution payments is non-delegable. We fail 
to see how the result under the MVRA, which imposes a 
mandatory obligation on the district court to schedule 
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restitution payments, see 18 U.S.C. S 3664(f)(2) (stating 
that "the court shall . . . specify . . . the manner . . . and 
the schedule . . . [of] restitution"), can be any different. 
 
We conclude that the District Court's failure to satisfy the 
MVRA's mandatory requirements under section 3664(f)(2), 
and its implicit delegation of its responsibilities to the 
probation office, constitute plain error. Accordingly, we 
vacate the restitution order and remand to the District 
Court for resentencing in light of the factors set forth in the 
MVRA, 18 U.S.C. S 3664(f)(2). 
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